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ABSTRACT 
Computer simulation models are used to predict the effects 
of three sample water policy decisions on selected conjunctive 
water use/sustained groundwater yield strategies for the Arkansas 
Grand Prairie. The three applications illustrate the facility of 
the target objective approach in providing an interface for 
legal, economic and engineering analysis. The approach is used 
to evaluate potential water management decisions at the judicial, 
legislative and water management district levels. 
INTRODUCTION 
Water resources management requires consideration of 
physical, legal and economic realities. Too often, attempts by 
legislators, judges and administrtors to manage the physical 
environment result in laws that are physically impossible (or 
nearly impossible) to implement. A Colorado Act illustrates this 
problem. 
The Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 
defined the water policy of Colorado as the integration of "the 
appropriation, use and administration of underground water 
tributary to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way 
as to max~m~ze the b~neficial use of all the waters of this 
state. 1I As Hubert Morel-Seytoux, et al (7) point out 
1I ••• the lawmaker may not have fully realized the meaning 
of the 'zeroth law' of Operations Research. It is not 
possible to maximize the beneficial use of surface water 
and to maximize the beneficial use of groundwater at 
the same time. It is possible, however, to maximize the 
beneficial use of surface water while maintaining a 
given level of beneficial use of groundwater, or vice 
versa. Or, more significantly, it is possible to maxi-
mize an overall beneficial us~ of groundwater and 
surface water. What this overall objective function 
should be is not precisely spelled out by the Act." 
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Furthermore, if the Colorado legislature really intended to 
"integrate II groundwater and surface water "appropriations, use 
and administration", then the creation of separate institutional 
entities to govern groundwater, as provided for in the Act, is 
not a logical move (5). Tension, competition and conflict 
accompany interagency efforts to coordinate management (16). For 
this reason, achieving conjunctive use of ground and surface 
water is more likely when both are managed by one agency (8,9). 
Numerous other deficiencies of the Act (which will not be 
discussed here) have been enumerated from the perspectives of a 
political scientist (5) and of an engineer (7). 
As the preceeding indicates, formulating adequate water laws 
and rules is not easy. Besides the uncertainties of nature, the 
legislator, judge, or administrator must also consider social and 
political realities. Unfortunately, true interdisciplinary 
analyses of potential effects of water laws are rarely made until 
after legislation is passed or court decisions are rendered. 
Those responsible for determining public water policy are often 
unaware of available technological tools or are uncertain about 
how such tools can be used. Perhaps because of groundwater's 
hidden nature, this lack of awareness is nowhere more apparent 
than in efforts to provide a legal framework for groundwater 
management. The development of laws governing groundwater use 
has usually preceeded an understanding of an aquifer's 
characteristics. As a result, perfected legal rights may bear 
scant resemblance to an aquifer's actual ability to sustain the 
legally permissible rate of pumping (12). 
One major difficulty in utilizing the best existing 
technology to analyze proposed policy changes lies in defining an 
interface between legal, economic and physical systems (15). 
Operationalizing terms, for example, translating legal terms into 
constraints suitable for inclusion in a computer groundwater 
simulation model, requires either a working knowledge of both law 
and engineering or cooperation and communication between 
practitioners of both disciplines (4). Even choosing units of 
measure can be a source of misunderstanding. Gallons were 
selected as the units of measure for water use in a draft version 
of a proposed Arkansas water code. One water resources engineer 
spent considerable time explaining to a legislative subcommittee 
why gallons would not be a feasible unit in application. 
(Another engineer observed in 1909 that "measuring water to 
irrigators in gallons would be like selling coal to railroads by 
the ounce ll <6>.) Considering the general lack of familiarity 
with basic engineering principles in our society, it is not 
surprising that highly technical methodologies require some 
elucidation. The water resources engineer is obligated to make 
his work accessible and understandable if he hopes to facilitate 
the systematic design of water laws (7). 
This paper describes efforts to accomplish this goal for the 
Arkansas Grand Prairie, a major rice, soybean, and aquacultural 
production area. A shallow Quaternary aqUifer supplies more than 
half of the Grand Prairie's irrigation and other water needs. 
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Average annual withdrawals from the aquifer have long exceeded 
recharge and a number of wells have become unusable (13). In 
recent years,' concern over (i) the 1980 drought and (ii) dropping 
water levels has provided impetus for the formation of an 
irrigation district in the Grand Prairie and for efforts by the 
State legislature to reformulate and codify Arkansas water law 
(9). Computer simulation models are utilized to predetermine the 
effects of three sample policy decision scenarios on Grand 
Prairie Quaternary water users. 
TARGET LEVEL AND TARGET OBJECTIVE APPROACHES 
Quantitative groundwater models have traditionally been used 
to predict water levels that result from given pumping rates. 
They are not designed to calculate the annual spatial 
distribution of pumping which will maintain groundwater at 
desired, or target, elevations. A different modeling approach 
has been developed to determine groundwater pumping that will 
maintain preselected target levels (12,13). The utility of the 
target level approach for maintaining 1982 Grand Prairie 
Quaternary water levels (as the chosen target levels) and the 
legal feasibility of using the approach with only minor 
modifications to Arkansas water law has been demonstrated 
(12,13). 
A refinement of the target level approach allows the 
investigator to choose a policy objective (10,11) rather than a 
specified potentiometric surface, such as the 1982 water levels 
previously reported. This target objective approach allows the 
simultaneous determination of (i) the optimal steady state 
potentiometric surface that best achieves the chosen objective 
and (ii) the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy that will 
create and maintain that surface. Models with this capability are 
valuable tools in the a priori analysis of water policy decisions 
before implementation. This paper illustrates the ramifications 
of three alternative policy decisions using the target objective 
approach. 
TESTED POLICIES AND RESULTS 
The Court-Imposed Correlative Rights Scenario 
As is true in most humid eastern states, water rights in 
Arkansas are based on the old English Common Law (a,b,c,d,f,i,j) 
and are delineated on a case by case basis (9). Under the common 
law, the right to use surface water is contingent upon ownership 
of riparian lands--lands directly adjacent to surface water--and 
is an actual part and parcel of the soil (h,k). Similarly, the 
right to use groundwater is incident to ownership of land 
overlying a groundwater basin (f,g). 
and 
The "reasonable use" rule is the standard for 
groundwater use in Arkansas (d,f). Riparian 
both surface 
or overlying 
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owners share a co-equal right to make reasonable use of the 
supply as long as such use does not unreasonably interfere 
the rights of similarly situated users (d). No user 
priority in use of water in derogation of another's rights" 
water 
with 
"has 
(k) • 
An owner of land overlying groundwater in Arkansas has the 
legal right to use the water "to the full extent of his needs if 
the common supply is suffiCient, and to the extent of a 
reasonable share thereof, if the supply is so scant that the use 
by one will affect the supply of other overlying users" (f). In 
times of scarcity, the California correlative rights doctrine 
governs, allowing each overlying landowner a proportionate or 
prorated share of the available supply (e,f). In a number of 
California cases, the correlative rights doctrine has been 
interpreted by the courts to require: (i) adjudication of a 
groundwater baSin, (ii) determination of a safe yield, and (iii) 
assignment of rights to a share of the available supply based on 
extraction prior to adjudication (1,7). 
Current pumping from the Quaternary aqUifer underlying the 
Grand Prairie is such that the use by one does "affect the supply 
of other overlying users". The fact that a growing number of 
wells are becoming unusable due to falling water levels and 
inadequate saturated thicknesses is ample proof of this (14). In 
the absence of effective water management, it is probably only a 
matter of time before an injured water user initiates litigation 
that will result in a court-ordered prorated redu~ti6n of pumping 
to achieve a (safe) sustained yield. The question is, then, what 
across-the-board percentage reduction of current extraction is 
necessary in order to attain a sustained yield from the aquifer? 
Utilizing the target objective approach, as described by 
Peralta, et a1 (11). the consequences of a strict application of 
the correlative rights doctrine can be predicted. Under a court 
ordered proportionate reduction, only 14% of 1982 pumping would 
be allowed in each cell. This 86% reduction in Quaternary 
groundwater use would result in a short term net economic 
reduction of over $8,000,000 per year for rice, irrigated 
soybeans and aquaculture. Being able to predict the result of 
delaying groundwater management decisions (and by default turning 
the courts into water management agencies) makes the need for 
active management measures obvious. It has been demonstrated 
that, over the long term, Quaternary groundwater can supply less 
than half of the demands currently being placed on the aquifer 
(11). This inability makes the need for conjunctive use of 
ground and surface water evident. 
Two Least-Cost Conjunctive Use/Sustained Yield Policy Scenarios 
Two versions of a water code have been introduced in the 
1985 Arkansas legislative session. One measure, House Bill 85 
and Senate Bill 131, is a slight modification of the 
comprehensive water code proposed to (and rejected by) the 1983 
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legislature. The second, Senate Bill 33 and House Bill 126, is a 
slightly more modified version of the 1983 proposal. There are a 
number of differences between the two measures currently under 
consideration , bu~ one common feature is the definition of legal 
water use as !treasonable beneficial use". Reasonable beneficial 
use is defined as "the use of water in such quantity as is 
necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose 
and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the 
public interest. lI 
Operationalizing this definition for inclusion in a water 
resources simulation model requires agreement on certain 
assumptions. First, as discussed above, the reasonable use rule 
allows only those uses which are not "in derogation of another's 
rights" (k). Neither groundwater (f) nor surface water (d) users 
may unreasonably interfere with the rights of others. As a 
logical extension of this interpretation, uses which result in 
saturated thicknesses so thin that wells become unusable, may 
well be ruled "unreasonab1ell • For an agricultural economy 
dependent on Quaternary groundwater, the economic results of 
exhausting the aquifer's usefulness would be catastrophic. 
Finally, mining which leads to excessive declines in the 
groundwater level may permanently damage the aquifer through 
compaction, lessening its future utility. Therefore, implementing 
a pumping strategy which guarantees a sustained yield "is both 
reasonable and consistent with the public interest." 
Since Quaternary groundwater alone can meet less than half 
of the long term demand, conjunctive use of ground and surface 
water is a necessity (11). "Economic and efficient utilization 
for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and 
consistent with the public interest ll , then, may be translated as 
a "least-cost conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy 11 for 
testing policy alternatives. 
For these alternatives, the target objective approach (10) 
is used to minimize the cost of attempting to satisfy the pre-
existing water needs for aquaculture, rice, and irrigated 
soybeans with ground water and supplemental diverted surface 
water. In performing the minimization, the model considers: (i) 
the cost per unit volume of Quaternary groundwater (based on the 
total dynamic head of a representative well in the center of each 
three mile by three mile cell in the study area); (ii) the cost 
per unit volume of diverted river water (in all cells to which 
diversion is feasible); and (iii) the opportunity cost--
reduction, in net economic return--per unit volume of unsatisfied 
water dema04 (in cells to which diversion of river water is not 
feasible). Th~ model assumes that divertable surface water 
resources are ad~quate to completely satisfy demand not met by 
Quaternary groundwate. in the cells to which surface water may be 
diverted. 
The model output is s- regional strategy consisting of 
the specified annual volumes of Quaternary groundwater and 
supplemental diverted surface water to be used in each cell. In 
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1416 COMPUTER APPLICATIONS I WATER RESOURCES 
the least-cost conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy, there 
are some demands (water needs currently being supplied by m1n1ng 
the Quaternary aquifer) that cannot be met over the long term by 
Quaternary groundwater or diverted surface water) in the 
northern part of the Grand Prairie. Each of the following 
scenarios represents a policy designed to balance actual 
groundwater withdrawals in each cell with those specified in the 
optimal least cost strategy. 
The alternate crop switch scenario. 
The alternate crop switch scenario outlines a mechanism for 
reducing water demand in cells where water needs cannot be 
conjunctively met over the long term. To reduce demand, acreages 
are switched on a crop by crop basis from aquaculture, rice or 
irrigated soybeans to nonirrigated soybeans. The question is how 
to prioritize the crop switch. Aquaculture provides the highest 
net economic return per acre, but the lowest net economic return 
per acre-foot of water. Irrigated soybeans provide the lowest 
net economic return on a per acre basis, but the highest net 
economic return per acre-foot of water used. If crops are 
switched on the basis of the least loss in return per acre, 
irrigated soybean acreages are switched first to dry land 
soybeans, followed by rice, and aquacultural acreages are 
switched last. If, on the other hand, one wishes to minimize the 
reduction in net economic return per acre-foot of unsatisfied 
demand, then aquacultural acreages are switched to dry land 
soybeans first, followed by rice, and finally by irrigated 
soybeans. Table I shows a comparison of the two alternatives. 
TABLE I.-Impact of chanl=!;inl=!; acrea~es to- d_ryJand soybeans. 
Change from 
current acres 
Aquaculture 
Change from 
current acres 
Rice 
Change from 
current acres 
Irri. Soybeans 
Change in net 
economic return 
Minimizing loss in 
return per acre 
-2,980 
-7,643 
-4,555 
Minimizing loss in 
return per acre-foot 
-3,338 
-6,806 
-3,265 
($5) -2,778,000 -=£. 70~.000 
Most regional economic analyses are performed on a per acre 
1asis. That approach implicity assumes that land is the limiting 
criteria. It is interesting to note in Table I that the 
reduction in net economic return is slightly less when the crop 
L 
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switch is implemented on a per acre-foot basis. 
that in a sustained yield setting, water may be 
criteria and rules for strategy implementation may 
approp~iately formulated on a per acre-foot basis. 
The economic incentive/disincentive scenario. 
This 
the 
be at 
suggests 
limiting 
least as 
Under the economic incentive/disincentive scenario, rebates 
and surcharges are utilized. The following example merely 
illustrates the utility of the target objective approach. and is 
not a policy recommendation. Assuming that economic 
considerations are the driving forces behind a water user's 
decision to use groundwater or surface water or to voluntarily 
switch to nonirrigated soybeans, the incentive (rebate) and the 
disincentive (surcharge) must be sufficient to motivate 
compliance with the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy. 
Water has traditionally been unvalued or undervalued (2,7). 
Disincentives have, as a reflection of the societal devaluation 
of water, often been too small to have any significant effect 
upon water use patterns. 
Orange County (California) Water District has successfully 
balanced the charge for overusing groundwater with the cost of 
importing supplemental surface water (3,9). The Orange County 
Water District Act authorizes the district to (i) determine 
whether an overdraft exists; and, if so, to (ii) "levy and assess 
a charge or replenishment assessment". The assessment varies 
according to the price of supplemental water, to insure that no 
water user has an economic incentive to overpump groundwater. 
The set of incentives and disincentives for the Arkansas Grand 
Prairie is necessarily different from the Orange County model. 
In Orange County, all needs are met through groundwater and 
purchased supplemental surface water. Unfortunately, it is not 
feasible to supply supplemental surface water to some cells in 
the Grand Prairie, so surcharges are calculated based on 
op~ortunity costs as well as the cost of diverted river water. 
The cost of groundwater is a function of the total dynamic 
head at the center of each cell and corresponding maintenance and 
energy costs. The cost of not using groundwater in a cell is 
either the cost of delivering diverted river water to the field 
or the opportunity cost of converting from a current crop to dry-
land soybeans. If the unit cost of an alternative to groundwater 
is less than the cost of groundwater, then a rebate is offered, 
as needed, to encourage adequate pumping to maintain regionally 
desirable hydraulic gradients. In the sample simulation, rebates 
are never required in cells not receiving supplemental surface 
water. If.the unit cost of alternatives is greater than the unit 
cost of groundwater, then a surcharge is levied for any pumping 
that exceeds desired annual volumes. Costs are calculated on an 
acre-foot basis and generally vary from cell to cell. The 
opportunity costs and surcharges are also different for each 
crop. since the net economic return per unit volume of consumed 
water varies from crop to c~op. 
?; 
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It should be noted that after implementation of a sustained 
yield strategy, groundwater levels gradually evolve from current 
levels to the target objective surface. During this process, the 
cost of groundwater changes from year to year (as do rebates and 
surcharges) until the target surface is reached (10). The 
discussion in this paper is limited to determining rebate and 
surcharge rates for the first year of management, based on 
current data. 
Rebates range up to $9.80 per acre-foot in cells where 
diverted surface water is more costly than groundwater. Since 
there is no unsatisfied demand in these cells, rebates are the 
same for each crop. The purpose of the rebates is to insure than 
water users are not penalized for pumping more expensive 
groundwater to help maintain the regional optimal strategy, when 
less expensive diverted surface water is available. 
Surcharges exist for all cells that do not qualify for 
rebates. Again, assuming current costs, surcharges in ceJls with 
available diverted surface water range up to $17.89/acre-foot, 
although for most cells it is less than $lO/acre-foot. For cells 
without access to diverted surface water, the greatest surcharges 
are $71.50/acre-foot for aquacultural use, $96.50/acre-foot for 
rice irrigation, and $122.60/acre-foot for soybean irrigation. 
Table 2 shows the maximum possible surcharges for 1985 water use. 
Table 2. Maximum Calculated Seasonal Surcharges 
---------------------------------------
Maximum Seasonal Maximum 
Surcharge Water Use Seasonal 
($/ae-ft) Cae-ft/ae) Surcharge 
($/ae) 
Aquaculture 71.50 7 500.50 
Rice 96.50 2 193.00 
Irrigated 
Soybeans 122.60 0.4 49.00 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The surcharges are of such magnitude that the profit of 
production would be eliminated, making it unlikely that producers 
would overpump groundwater. If dramatic increases in crop values 
occur after surcharge rates are fixed for the year, water"users 
might wish to continue pumping at current rates. In such a case, 
some $2,234,000 in total surcharge revenues would be generated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Formulating appropriate water laws and rules is not easy. 
Besides the vagaries of nature, water policy decision makers must 
also consider the social and political ramifications of their 
I' 
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actions. Too often, judges, legislators and administrators are 
unaware of availble techniical tools for water management or are 
uncertain about how these tools can be used. Water resource 
engineers have the obligation not only to develop such tools, but 
to also make them accessible and understandable. 
J"" " 
The paper 'pres~nts applications of the target objective 
approach to regional" water management. The approach is readily 
adapted to interdisciplinary analysis and provides an interface 
between legal, economic and engineering systems. It allows the 
simultaneous determination of (i) the optimal steady state 
potentiometric surface that best achieves the chosen regional 
objective and (ii) the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy 
that will create and maintain that surface. 
The applications represent possible policy choices made on 
the judicial, legislative and water management district levels. 
The potential for future use is not limited to research initiated 
within a single discipline, but to investigations in law, 
economics, political science and sociology as well as in 
engineering. 
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